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ABSTRACT: This review describes the social and ethical responses to the history of innovations in forensic genetics 
and their application to criminal investigations. Following an outline of the three recurrent social perspectives that 
have informed these responses (crime management, due process, and genetic surveillance), it goes on to introduce the 
repertoire of ethical considerations by describing a series of key reports that have shaped subsequent commentaries 
on forensic DNA profi ling and databasing. Four major ethical concerns form the focus of the remainder of the paper 
(dignity, privacy, justice, and social solidarity), and key features of forensic genetic practice are examined in the 
light of these concerns. The paper concludes with a discussion of the concept of “proportionality” as a resource for 
balancing the social and ethical risks and benefi ts of the use of forensic genetics in support of criminal justice.
KEYWORDS: Ancestry informative markers, dignity, DNA databasing, DNA profi ling, ethics, externally visible 
characteristics, forensic DNA phenotyping, justice, privacy, proportionality, SNPs, STRs.
inference of externally visible characteristics (EVCs) 
[70]; biogeographic ancestry-informative markers 
(AIMs) [117]; and the increasingly comprehensive 
genetic analyses that are made available by so-called 
“next generation sequencing” (NGS) or “massively 
parallel sequencing” (MPS) technologies [12]. Alongside 
these efforts there is also ongoing work which attempts 
to identify the source of the body fl uids from which 
biological samples have been extracted in order to more 
rigorously test assertions about the potential signifi cance 
of DNA evidence in particular cases [137].
 Forensic genetics technologies have been introduced 
into routine criminal justice uses alongside collective 
discussions of their ethical legitimacy and legal 
evaluation of their reliability. The history of these 
social considerations remind us that it is important that 
forensic genetics researchers and claims-makers avoid 
the promotion of “technologies of hubris” [64] in which 
scientifi c certainty and technological robustness are 
overstated, and social consent is assumed in advance of 
detailed deliberation. Scientifi c knowledge production 
and technological innovation are part of the ordering 
of contemporary societies and impact on personal and 
communal life in signifi cant ways: scientifi c knowledge 
infl uences how we understand the world, while techno-
logies guide us in the ways we can engage with it. Over 
the last decades it has become apparent that research 
and innovation are not independent of society but are 
social processes interwoven with other social domains 
such as education, health, law, politics, the economy, 
and the environment (see for example [10,49,53,65,80]). 
Social structures and cultural narratives shape scientifi c 
and technological endeavors. Accordingly it is vital for 
researchers, as well as the commissioners and users of 
research, to develop an understanding of the various 
INTRODUCTION
 Since their fi rst appearance in the 1980s, forensic 
DNA profi ling technologies have become an increasingly 
important aspect of criminal, security, and mass disaster 
investigations. This has been made possible by a com-
bination of technical, organizational, and legislative 
developments that include improvements in DNA collec-
tion, extraction, and analysis processes; the establishment 
of national and international laboratory standards; judicial 
acceptance of the robustness of DNA evidence; and the 
growth of national forensic DNA databases as a means 
of storing, searching, and comparing crime scene DNA 
profi les with profi les obtained from known individuals and 
retained under a variety of legal regimes. It is generally 
accepted that the majority of these applications are more 
effective in supporting investigations and prosecutions 
wherever legislation permits criminal investigators to 
take, use, and retain biological samples from a large 
number of crime scenes and from many categories of 
individual subjects.
 Scientifi c and technical features of these developments 
have been described in detail elsewhere (see for example 
[8,20,21,136]). Advances in the chemistry and uses of 
standardized STR multiplexes have occurred globally, 
and there has been increasing use of Y-STRs and of 
mitochondrial sequencing to support more specialized 
investigatory uses like familial searching for offenders, 
and the identifi cation of human remains [89]. Recently, 
there has been a signifi cant growth of research and 
innovation concerned with the analysis of genetic data 
where crime scene DNA samples are available, but where 
profi les derived from these samples have not matched 
databased profi les obtained from known subjects. Three 
areas of work have become increasingly prominent: the 
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social and ethical promises and problems of emerging 
technologies. Studying such aspects can offer insights 
into their “ramifi cations” and potential effects on human 
practices [124], thus helping to better articulate the 
rationale for, and use of, particular technologies. The 
aim of such interventions is to help render technologies 
socially acceptable rather than shutting down viable lines 
of development because of assertions of their potential 
ethical or wider social hazards.
I. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON FORENSIC
GENETICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
 This review maps the landscape of discourses around 
the social and ethical aspects of using forensic genetics in 
the criminal justice systems of Europe and beyond. In the 
review we follow what we have described elsewhere as a 
series of waves of technological innovation in this fi eld 
[157,162] and pay attention to the variety of standpoints 
that can be found in social and ethical commentaries 
on them. Our starting point is an observation of the 
tension between three commonly held perspectives 
in contemporary debates on the use of genetic science 
and technology in support of security and justice. These 
perspectives are described below. Although not mutually 
exclusive, they emphasize different features of criminal 
justice objectives and processes, and their location within 
wider social structures.
A. Crime Management
 The fi rst perspective celebrates innovation in 
forensic DNA profi ling and databasing as contributing 
positively to the detection and conviction of criminal 
suspects [14,149] by arguing that the expansion of the 
scientifi c toolbox available to law enforcement and 
other users of forensic genetic technologies increases 
the effectiveness of investigations. Acceptance of this 
argument by legislators and criminal justice agencies 
has led to a signifi cant increase of biological samples 
— from crime scenes and individuals — being taken, 
stored, and used in those jurisdictions permitting the 
adopting of various kinds of DNA technologies. This 
increase has been accompanied by a widening of the 
categories of individuals subject to forensic profi ling and 
analysis, and the expansion of jurisdictions’ adoption 
of DNA technologies globally. A further development 
under this perspective — fueled by the potential 
investigatory gains that may result from cross-border 
exchanges — is the emerging routine sharing of DNA 
profi le data across national boundaries. For example, 
the Prüm Treaty evidences the commitment of a large 
number of European Union states to making such gains. 
The effi ciency argument fi nds its strongest expression in 
the consideration of “universal” DNA databases [29,68]. 
A recent commitment to setting up a universal database 
of citizens, residents, and visitors was made in Kuwait 
[146] and remains, as far as we are aware at this writing, 
the only attempt at doing so globally.
 The notion that forensic genetic technologies can 
improve the capacity of their state users to control crime 
instantiates a longstanding preoccupation with police 
uses of novel technological interventions of various 
kinds, including information and communications 
technology, surveillance equipment, weaponry and 
vehicles, as well as the expanding repertoire of forensic 
science. The use of these interventions, it is often asserted, 
will lend scientifi c and technological support to efforts to 
improve the effectiveness of crime detection, and may 
also contribute (although this may be more diffi cult to 
establish) to the deterrence or desistence of offenders. 
The historical context for this “scientifi cation” [36] of 
policing, along with the extension of police powers 
required for its uses to control crime through effective 
detection, was the political necessity to confront rising 
crime rates in many jurisdictions during the second half 
of the 20th century, along with increasing awareness 
of, and attention to, the economic, social and emotional 
effects of crime (see [26,45] for discussions of the “crime 
control” model in the UK and the US).
 Recently, there has been an internationalization of 
crime-control considerations in efforts to counter cross-
border criminality and terrorist threats. The European 
Union has witnessed the introduction of a number of 
distinct measures, some of which have direct relevance 
to the use of DNA profi ling to assist investigations 
and prosecutions. The most important of these is the 
Prüm Treaty, a development that refl ects the earlier 
Hague Principle of Availability, and which establishes 
infrastructure and procedures to make it possible for 
European states to share particular forms of intelligence 
[121]. Among these cross-border exchanges is the sharing 
of DNA information, albeit under strict conditions that 
ensure that only anonymized profi les are compared, 
and where “national contact points” manage the 
process whenever matches are obtained. Another is the 
creation of the European Investigation Order (EIO) [28], 
suggested in 2010 and negotiated between the Council 
of the European Union and the European Parliament 
since 2011. Taken together, these measures expand 
existing police powers to include mutual cross-border 
investigative support that may require the use of genetic 
and other technologies for criminal investigation by 
authorities in one state in order to fulfi l the investigative 
requirements of authorities in another state. The EIO 
itself goes beyond the data-sharing agreements of the 
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Prüm Treaty, leading to unease about a dominance of 
criminal justice functionality and forensic utility over 
civil liberties within and between different national 
jurisdictions [156].
 The notion of “investigative value” is a central 
good within the crime-control perspective, and much 
of the enthusiasm for advances in DNA profi ling and 
databasing is informed by the assumed capacity of these 
technologies to add to such value. This assumption entails 
that new or enhanced investigative affordances are made 
possible through scientifi c and operational developments 
in the collection, analysis, and uses of genetic material, 
producing intelligence in investigations, evidence to 
support prosecutions, and in some cases, grounds for 
the exoneration of wrongly convicted individuals. 
The development of national DNA databases, and 
the expansion of police powers to collect, retain, and 
use DNA samples in many European member states, 
refl ect the crime-control model’s utilitarian approach 
to increasing the effectiveness and professionalization 
of crime-investigation services through the exploitation 
of technological opportunities and operational improve-
ments. It is regularly asserted that increased access to 
ever-growing DNA databases, as well as investment in 
new DNA-profi ling technologies, will further enhance 
the capacity of the police to use genetic information to 
detect suspects quickly and unequivocally, and in this 
way contribute to the detection and reduction of crime 
and an improvement in public safety.
 In an increasingly “geneticized” and technological 
society, such promissory narratives about technology have 
become commonplace. It is almost universally accepted 
that DNA intelligence and evidence can be technically 
superior to that provided by other forensic disciplines. 
Its basic assumptions are much better supported by peer-
reviewed research carried out in a range of contexts, 
and its routine practices have been subject to extensive 
external scrutiny [105]. This technical superiority means 
— for the wider criminal justice community as well 
as for the general public — that DNA analysis can be 
expected to be able to deliver fast, clear, and precise 
answers for the typical questions asked in the course of 
criminal investigations: what has been described as the 
“CSI effect” of public perceptions of DNA analysis. This 
(imagined) capacity in turn strengthens the perceived 
“exceptionalism” of DNA, and its actual and promised 
role in criminal investigations [160].
 However, these expectations about effective crime 
control through DNA technologies have been contested 
by some critical observers [9,29,47,91,101]. These and 
other critics have argued that the results of existing 
research have shown that it is much more diffi cult 
than is normally understood to establish the utility of 
various DNA profi ling and databasing techniques and 
their impact on crime detection. Although crime-control 
imperatives stress notions of effi ciency [31], relevant 
data have proven to be diffi cult to capture and hard to 
interpret [161]. This criticism applies to well-established 
technologies, and is even more relevant to the assessment 
of more recent innovations such as familial searching, 
the use of ancestry-informative markers, and those that 
seek to infer externally visible characteristics from DNA 
samples. There have been no systematic case-based 
studies of the use of DNA in support of crime detection 
and prosecution in the UK since the Pathfi nder study 
carried out between June 2000 and May 2001, and 
published in 2005. This is one of the reasons behind the 
call by the UK Human Genetics Commission for the 
development of a much more systematic approach to the 
measurement of “forensic utility” to be applied to the 
evaluation of DNA profi ling in the UK [63]. Researchers 
in Australia [15–17,126–128] and US-based studies have 
begun to provide much better data on the contribution of 
DNA to detections and prosecutions. One US study is 
based on a randomized control trial of the use of DNA 
profi ling in support of property crime [129], and a second 
series of studies [114–116] is based on the analysis of a 
large number of case trajectories.
B. Due Process
 A second perspective emphasizes the contribution 
made by DNA profi ling to the quality of expert evidence 
provided in support of prosecution or defense cases 
in criminal trials. Lawmakers and law enforcers in 
contemporary liberal democratic societies recognize 
that criminal justice systems cannot be driven by crime 
management imperatives alone. Another set of imperatives 
are regularly brought into play alongside them, and — to 
an extent — also modify their application in practice. 
These alternative “due process” considerations require 
that the proper operation of a criminal justice system 
provides fair treatment and trialing of suspects and 
defendants, and strong measures to protect their rights in 
the judicial process of criminal investigations. Central to 
a due-process focus is the idea that the criminal justice 
system acts not to convict offenders — although that may 
be one of its outcomes — but to discern and adjudicate 
truthfulness and fairness in the administration of justice. 
From this perspective, it is the courts rather than the 
police who hold defi nitive authority for the disposition 
of those suspected of or charged with criminal offenses. 
Although the police should be afforded relevant and 
legitimate powers to investigate possible offenses and 
detect suspects, those powers, including the authority 
to draw on scientifi c expertise, must be “balanced” with 
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the rights of individuals guaranteed by civil society. 
Furthermore, where scientifi c intelligence and evidence 
play a signifi cant role in contemporary criminal justice 
investigations, it is essential that courts are understood 
as the source of fi nal authority in determining whether 
these forms of intelligence and evidence are based 
on valid foundations and reliable methods. Although 
forensic scientists have sometimes found the ways in 
which courts exercise this authority unresponsive to what 
they regard as principled scientifi c practice, and courts 
have sometimes struggled to cope with new science, the 
legitimate authority of the courts in these matters is an 
essential feature of the rule of law in modern democratic 
societies.
 The forensic science community in general 
continuously faces both internal and external anxieties 
about the reliability and strength of its research base as 
well as some of its routine practices [35,81,93,103,104]. 
Inspired by such concerns, the recent review of forensic 
science by the US National Academy of Sciences 
[105], and a FBI retrospective enquiry into all criminal 
investigations that have relied on forensic hair and fi ber 
data and expertise [60,85], continue to threaten judicial 
and public confi dence in some, although not all, forensic 
technologies. Early challenges to the uses of forensic 
genetics in courtroom deliberations included those in 
1989 in the USA “Castro case” [63,66,79] throughout 
which the presented DNA “evidence” was challenged 
on the basis of nonstandardized local DNA-profi ling 
practices that diverged considerably between US 
laboratories. An equally signifi cant challenge to police 
management of forensic evidence was made throughout 
the O. J. Simpson double-murder trial in 1995. It is an 
inherent matter of fact and of concern that forensic work 
is “messy”. Samples are taken in inclement environments 
and can be partial, degraded, or contaminated. Physical 
laboratory-based sciences may consider the work with 
such materials — for example, due to the nature of a 
crime, conditions at a crime scene, or owed to collection 
and storage practices of samples — as “impure” 
technical rather than scientifi c work. Contamination, 
in practical rather than epistemic terms, is a concern in 
forensic work and has been raised by practitioners, users, 
and courts. The signifi cant message from the defense’s 
critique of DNA evidence in the O. J. Simpson case 
was that forensic genetic investigative and adjudicatory 
values are as dependent on the correct and transparent 
management of evidence as they are on the underlying 
science and its technological application. In fact, critics 
of the use of DNA evidence in particular cases tend to 
confuse the two concerns, often claiming “fl aws in the 
science”, where errors could in fact be more accurately 
describe as “fl aws in the handling of evidence”. Evidence 
handling is important for all kinds of forensic science, 
but the superabundance and persistence of DNA means 
that particular care needs to be exercised within this 
domain. As tests have become increasingly sensitive, 
and knowledge of DNA persistence and transfer has 
grown, concerns have surfaced about the possibility of 
contamination in earlier cases; and some more recent 
cases have also been problematized. The advent of DNA 
technologies that are capable of generating profi les from 
vanishingly small amounts of biological material has 
made the issue of potential contamination increasingly 
urgent.
 In addition, judges and advocates have sometimes 
struggled with the reasoning practices of forensic DNA 
scientists and — at least in the UK — the judiciary has 
not supported attempts by some advocates to educate 
factfi nders in Bayesian versions of these practices. 
The diffi culty of engaging with the probability basis 
of forensic genetics has been problematized constantly 
since the emergence of this fi eld [7,75,76,82,143], and 
was the focus of two US National Research Council 
reports on forensic genetics published in the 1990s. Due 
process considerations require expert scientists to be 
balanced in their fi ndings in order to avoid prosecution 
or defense bias. Several US and UK groups have sought 
to provide clear accounts of the kinds of statistical 
reasoning preferred by forensic genetic scientists and 
expert witnesses in order to support efforts at proper 
balance (UK examples include [1,123]; US examples 
include [59,67,97,144]). Expert interpretations can be 
misleading, as argued in a recent piece in the UK Law 
Society Gazette:
‘The DNA profi le from the handgun matches that of 
the suspect; the chance that some unknown person 
unrelated to the suspect would have the same profi le 
is one in a billion.’ … If the DNA had come from a 
close relative of the suspect then the chance of a 
match would be much greater than one in a billion – 
perhaps one in 10,000. Why not give that alternative? 
The reality is that the choice of an unrelated person 
for the alternative maximises the weight of evidence 
against the suspect. A balanced approach would not do 
this: indeed a balanced approach would not offer any 
evaluative opinion, or statistic unless the circumstances 
of the case implied a clear defence alternative. [40]
 Yet despite such historic and ongoing procedural 
and methodological diffi culties, it is obvious that 
the contribution of DNA profi ling to the due-process 
principles of liberal-democratic societies has been 
overwhelmingly positive. Its use in exonerating innocent 
individuals and righting wrongful convictions has 
provided a spectacular instance of this contribution. This 
has been especially so in the United States, where the 
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Innocence Project, founded by Scheck and Neufeld in 
the wake of the O. J. Simpson trial, has provided a model 
subsequently followed by individuals and groups in other 
jurisdictions. Although Scheck’s skills of advocacy were 
used successfully to question the credibility of DNA 
evidence presented during the Simpson trial, he and 
other participants in the Innocence Project subsequently 
have obtained judgments requiring the analysis, or 
reanalysis, of biological evidence retained from a 
number of previously contested convictions [109,135]. 
In a signifi cant number of these cases, DNA profi ling has 
helped to establish that miscarriages of justice have taken 
place and that innocent people have been incarcerated, in 
some cases for long periods of time. Scheck in particular 
has become a supporter not only of DNA profi ling, but 
also of DNA databasing, which he argues is capable 
of providing “prospective exoneration” of individuals 
who otherwise might well become the subject of police 
suspicion and worse, but for the fact that their databased 
DNA profi le does not match samples recovered from the 
crime scene in question.
C. Genetic Surveillance
 The third perspective on social and ethical aspects of 
forensic genetics emphasizes concerns about new forms 
of biological surveillance of citizens, residents, visitors, 
and migrants, enabled by the expansion of forensic DNA 
profi ling and databasing [33,107,147]. Various academic, 
legal, and civil society groups, especially those that have 
applied to the forensic fi eld prior bioethical anxieties 
concerning the collection and use of human genetic 
material, have reacted more critically to many of these 
developments and applications. Central to these more 
critical standpoints has been a concern with the potential 
effects of the increased surveillance of citizens made 
possible by the expansion of forensic DNA profi ling and 
databasing, as well as questions about which agencies 
will have access to DNA samples and profi les and for 
what purposes. Problems have also been raised about 
the governance of this new domain, especially in light 
of the typically restricted participation of non-police 
actors in key policy and decision-making fora. There 
has been particular criticism of instances of unthinking 
enthusiasm for increasing the size and scope of forensic 
DNA databases, and also of the use of unsupported 
assumptions about the relationship between genetic and 
phenotypical characteristics.
 In the United Kingdom, two major agencies — the 
Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics and the Human Genetics 
Commission — have both published substantial critical 
reports on the distinctively forceful legislative and 
operational developments in DNA databasing that 
occurred in England and Wales between the establishment 
of the National DNA Database in 1995 and the decision 
of the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human 
Rights (ECrHR) in the 2008 case of S and Marper v the 
UK Government [27]. In addition, the monitoring group 
GeneWatch UK have also been actively interrogating 
offi cial statements and statistics on the National DNA 
Database for a number of years as well as appearing 
before several Parliamentary House of Commons 
Committees that have inquired into aspects of forensic 
DNA profi ling and databasing in England and Wales. In 
the United States, the American Civil Liberties Union has 
frequently criticized the state and federal expansion of 
DNA collection and retention [78]. Elsewhere in Europe, 
similar criticisms have been voiced sporadically and in 
an insular manner, for example by the activist German 
“Campaign against DNA collection frenzy” [46]. The 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union has delivered evidence 
to the Hungarian Parliamentary debate into surveillance 
and data protection of human genetic data [62]. It is 
widely acknowledged that the collection, retention, and 
use of various kinds of biological materials, usually 
without the consent of those from whom they were 
taken or retrieved, along with the information routinely 
derived from them, raises signifi cant policy questions. 
These policy questions have traditionally focused on 
the establishment, exercise, and monitoring of powers 
necessary for the effective and ethical collection and use 
of such materials, and the balance between the state use 
of these powers and the rights — to autonomy, liberty, 
privacy, and justice — of individual subjects.
 The emergence and development of forensic genetic 
technologies has facilitated the introduction of a wide 
range of novel social institutions (such as forensic DNA 
databases and their governing bodies) as well as new 
stakeholders (such as the commercial providers of DNA 
hardware, software, and DNA analysis services) relevant 
to crime detection and prosecution. They have sparked 
the public and professional imagination, translated into 
popular culture imaginations around DNA (e.g., the 
CSI-effect; DNA as the locus of one’s self [108]), but 
also into investigative expectations that persons can be 
individuated using biological matter, that such matter 
can be transferred between a person and an object or 
crime scene, and that such traces can usefully inform 
investigations (termed “forensic imaginary” in [158]).
II. APPLYING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES TO
THE USE OF FORENSIC GENETICS
 In this section of our review we bring together 
a wide variety of social commentaries on forensic 
genetics technologies and their application in security 
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and justice contexts, and suggest a thematic reading of 
these. A large number of ethical principles and concepts 
appear in contemporary discussions of the human and 
social implications of advances in biotechnology; only 
the most important of these principles and concepts —
as we perceive them to be — are outlined below. We 
go on to discuss how they have already appeared in 
previous assessments of the ethical dimensions of three 
longstanding aspects of forensic genetics: biological 
sample collection, autosomal STR profi ling, and forensic 
DNA databasing; and also provide a reconsideration of 
the application of these principles and concepts to several 
of the new and emerging forensic DNA technologies 
that have recently become available to support criminal 
investigations.
A. Laying the Foundation: Major (English Language) 
Reports
 Four independent expert groups have provided 
signposts for much of the social, ethical, and policy 
discussions of forensic genetics. These groups are: 
1. The US National Commission on the Future of 
DNA Evidence (which met between 1998 and 2000, 
disseminated its deliberations on the Internet, and 
published several reports, including “The Future 
of DNA Testing: Predictions of the Research and 
Development Working Group” in November 2000) 
[102];
2. The American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
(ASLME) Project on DNA Fingerprinting and Civil 
Liberties (which held meetings at the Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, between 2003 
and 2005, and whose work is represented in a series 
of papers in a special issue of the Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics published in Summer 2006) [3];
3. The Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics Working Party 
on the Forensic Uses of Bioinformation: Ethical 
Issues (which took evidence from a variety of experts 
between 2006 and 2007 and published its report in 
late 2007) [110]; and 
4. The UK Human Genetics Commission Working 
Party on the National DNA Database (whose work 
was informed by a “Citizen’s Inquiry” into the UK 
National DNA Database in 2008, and who published 
“Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?” in 2009) [61].
 The work of these four groups took place between 
1998 and 2009 and drew on a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives. The US National Commission was 
especially concerned with legal and technical features 
of the development of DNA profi ling. Although it 
recognized that “a number of issues raised in this report 
have social, ethical, and legal implications beyond the 
assignment of the working group” and identifi ed some 
of these issues, it called on other groups to pursue them 
in more detail. At the same time, it considered a number 
of policy questions, including questions concerning 
the appropriate scope of DNA sampling and retention 
as well as the reduction of sample backlogs. It also 
recommended the establishment of systematic research 
efforts to determine the effectiveness of police uses of 
DNA profi ling and databasing and “how the technology 
affects the investigative process”.
 The ASLME project (funded by the US National 
Institutes of Health) took up many of the topics that the 
US National Commission had declared itself unable 
to pursue: a range of social, ethical, and legal issues, 
especially those that surrounded questions of privacy 
and civil liberty. There was no effort to produce a 
consensus report by those involved in the workshops, 
and (perhaps unsurprisingly) more attention was given 
to US preoccupations and practices than to those from 
elsewhere. Instead of attempting to generate agreement, 
participants were encouraged to provide normative 
and factual resources that would “direct the public 
discourse so essential for shaping how DNA forensics 
and technology is applied and used” [99]. Recurrent 
questions that were explored included database 
inclusiveness, sample retention, “racial identifi cation”, 
informed consent, the scope of profi le uses, and the 
effects of DNA identifi cation on family relationships.
 In addition to these US efforts, two UK projects 
(by the Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics and the Human 
Genetics Commission) also sought to provide resources 
for future public deliberations, but also undertook formal 
public consultation among their working methods. The 
two projects used very different methods to structure 
these consultations. The Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics 
Working Party disseminated, to individuals and 
organizations known to be active in the fi eld of forensic 
bioinformation (and also more generally on its public 
website), a “consultation paper” containing information 
and a series of questions. The consultation received 
135 responses, and an analysis of these responses was 
presented in the Working Party’s Report. The report itself 
focused on the ethical, social, and legal issues that the 
authors argued were current at the time, alongside what 
they could discern as “potential future” uses of forensic 
bioinformation. The group supplemented a focus on 
forensic genetics with consideration of fi ngerprint 
collection and comparison. They argued in general 
terms that although “well-functioning forensic databases 
have the potential to promote the public interest to a 
signifi cant degree” [110], it was equally important that 
their existence and uses did not signifi cantly challenge 
the inventory of ethical values generally upheld in liberal 
democracies, identifi ed as those of “liberty, autonomy, 
privacy, informed consent, and equality.” The report 
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contained a large number of recommendations for 
changes in the governance of research and operational 
uses of forensic genetics informed by a rights-based 
approach that sought to balance the demands of public 
protection against the protection of these core ethical 
values, or between the common good of security and the 
individual good of personal liberty.
 The UK Human Genetics Commission (HGC) had 
a longstanding interest in forensic DNA profi ling and 
databasing dating back to the early years of this century, 
even though on some occasions they had struggled 
to sustain this interest in the face of government 
reservations about including this domain within their 
work program. Before undertaking the study that led 
to “Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?”, the HGC had 
included consideration of the UK National DNA database 
(NDNAD) in several of the previous studies, and they 
had successfully lobbied government for representation 
on the NDNAD Strategy Board. In preparation for what 
has been their most detailed work on forensic genetics, 
the group had (along with the Economic and Social 
Research Council Genomics Policy and Research Forum 
in Edinburgh, and the Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences 
(PEALS) Research Centre in Newcastle) commissioned 
a “Citizens Inquiry” into the NDNAD. This inquiry 
established two public panels who heard evidence from 
“interest groups, the police, database governance bodies, 
forensic scientists and journalists” [61]. The panels also 
visited Scottish Parliament and a community center in 
the London Borough of Hackney in order to hear from a 
variety of people with political interests in, and personal 
experience of, the police uses of forensic genetics. 
Following completion of the Citizens Inquiry, the HGC 
also undertook a wider public consultation, with some of 
the results included in the published report. The report 
itself made a number of signifi cant observations, many 
of which supplemented and extended those made earlier 
by the Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics Working Party. 
 Emphasizing the often unappreciated novelty of 
forensic DNA databases, they noted policy confusion in 
how the UK NDNAD was characterized and governed 
as well as the inadequacy of current ways of determining 
its utility. One chapter of the report was devoted to an 
analysis of the “consequences, both experienced and 
implied, of the NDNAD for individuals and society” 
[61], and another to understanding the implications 
of newly emerging forensic genetic technologies, 
and the relationship between forensic and medical 
genetics. Finally, the report’s authors offered a series of 
recommendations aimed at redressing the shortcomings in 
policy and governance they had identifi ed. Among these 
were: the commissioning of privacy and equality impact 
assessments of NDNAD regimes; the development of 
agreed measures of “forensic utility” and the public 
dissemination of data on uses; the harmonization of 
biomarkers across the EU (and possibly elsewhere), 
along with the development of measures to control 
and monitor international datasharing; and improved 
NDNAD governance, including the establishment of an 
independent oversight body and a strengthening of the 
powers and standing of the NDNAD Ethics Group.
 When read together, these four sets of deliberations 
provide a good general sense of the range of social and 
ethical issues raised by developments in, and operational 
applications of, forensic genetics to criminal justice. 
Although participants in them did not all come to the same 
conclusions, there was some overlap in what they chose 
to examine in detail, and they are useful in reminding 
us of the prevailing repertoire of concepts and concerns 
that make up the application of ethical principles to 
forensic genetics. This “prevailing repertoire” we mean 
to denote debates over the following values and how 
they are engaged in the application of forensic genetic 
innovations, especially in liberal democratic societies: 
dignity and respect for persons; personal privacy; justice 
and equality; and social solidarity. These concepts have 
been used to inform the themes and narratives that have 
emerged in the course of the main academic and policy 
debates and exchanges over the benefi ts and risks of 
innovations in forensic genetics over the last few decades. 
In the next section of this review we undertake a more 
detailed examination of this repertoire and point to some 
of the controversies, both historical and contemporary, 
that surround the elements that make it up.
B. Dignity and Bodily Integrity
 Much contemporary discussion of bioinformation 
tends to treat the bodies on which such technologies are 
focused as “informational objects”, and then focuses on 
social, ethical, and policy issues that arise in the course of 
the further analysis and/or uses of that information. This 
tendency forecloses consideration of important issues 
of human dignity and bodily integrity that arise in DNA 
profi ling and databasing from the initial sampling of 
bodies as anatomical subjects. Although some observers 
are content to label these issues as “bodily privacy”, 
the terms chosen in this heading more apparently frame 
invasive procedures that cross the boundary of the body 
(for example through the collection of blood or tissue 
using a variety of instruments to penetrate the skin, or 
via body openings such as the mouth) as potentially 
challenging a person’s innate right to bodily integrity. 
As Gerlach points out, “Privacy is about protecting 
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information, while bodily integrity is about protecting 
the thing itself.” [48] There is a long history of 
legislation that recognizes this right in a large number 
of liberal-democratic jurisdictions, and its meaning and 
signifi cance have been explored in deliberations about 
medical treatments and in penal practices.
 Human dignity refers to the inherent worth of a 
human being in a community of equal beings. A central 
premise of this principle is that persons have to be 
treated as ends in themselves, and not as a means to the 
ends of others. An additional element in the principle is 
that the diversity inherent to humanity is deserving of 
respect. The UNESCO 1997 Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights refers to this 
when it asserts the necessity “not to reduce individuals 
to their genetic characteristics and to respect their 
uniqueness and diversity,” and further suggests that the 
collection of DNA samples must observe the dignity and 
bodily integrity of the donor. In the European Union 
(EU), the right to be treated with dignity is enshrined 
in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU [23]. The preservation of the physical and 
mental integrity of the person (as posited in Article 3 
of the Charter) supplements the principle of dignity. 
The concept of bodily integrity used here refers to the 
requirement that people are treated as “whole beings” 
so that the boundaries of their bodies are to be preserved 
from unreasonable interference or intrusion, and this 
requirement also underpins notions of human freedom 
and liberty. Häyry [54–57] has written extensively about 
dignity as one of a series of fundamental European 
ethical values. Although the signifi cance of the term can 
vary according to the different traditions in which its use 
is located, there remains for Häyry and Takala a core 
meaning, that “our physical, moral and genetic integrity 
must be defended both against violations stemming 
from other people’s interests, and from violations 
arising from our own whims and desires” [57]. Ethical 
reasoning underpinning the criminal justice systems 
of liberal-democratic societies usually recognizes the 
necessity of balancing guarantees of individual human 
rights and civil liberties against the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system in its delivery of public interest 
objectives. For forensic DNA profi ling this reasoning 
may suggest that sampling, storage, and use of DNA 
profi les is only a minor infraction of human rights 
compared to the delivery of social goods that are in the 
public interest. Nevertheless, there remain dignitarian 
and liberty questions about which individuals should be 
subject to compulsory sampling, how, and at what stage 
in the criminal process.
1. Invasiveness of Sampling
 The long history of efforts to secure the body of 
citizens from interference by state authorities is noted in 
Gerlach’s account of deliberations on the establishment 
of forensic DNA sampling and databanking regimes in 
Canada. In Canada, and elsewhere, according to Gerlach, 
there has been a tendency to exclude issues of bodily 
integrity from consideration, instead displacing it with 
an attentiveness to privacy: “it normalizes a shift in how 
we conceive of the body in criminal law, a shift that was 
enshrined in legislation through the exclusion of bodily 
integrity and the inclusion of privacy safeguards” [48], 
and in this way privileges state interest and power over 
citizens’ sovereignty over their bodies. Entwined with 
this development is another kind of shift about the level 
of intrusiveness into the human body that is permissible 
for sampling. Van der Ploeg [153] reminds us that issues 
of bodily integrity come into focus whenever medical or 
criminal justice procedures involve crossing “internal” 
and “external” bodily boundaries; and while penetrating 
the skin (for example, to take a blood sample) is a clear 
instance of such boundary crossing, naturally occurring 
bodily openings are also zones of particular contention, 
and cultural and personal sensitivities. Along with others, 
she argues that the breach of bodily integrity — and thus 
a limitation to a person’s dignity — that results from the 
taking of material from the mouth in the form of buccal 
swabs is a serious one, and one whose signifi cance is 
acknowledged by the extensiveness of legal debates 
about the practice of such “bodily searches” in a 
number of criminal jurisdictions. Although not arguing 
against such sampling, Steventon has cautioned against 
increasing the range and number of criminal cases that 
require sampling from formerly intimate body areas such 
as the mouth [141], Although Mooki traces “a direct link 
between greater interference by the state with the bodily 
integrity of individuals” [98] in the extension of police 
powers to sample from formerly intimate body areas. 
The general concern here seems to lie with the possibility 
of a creeping redefi ning of further areas of the body as 
not intimate in nature, although it is diffi cult to imagine 
the criminal justice necessity for any such extension, 
especially as emerging technological innovations will 
enable less-invasive sampling.
2. Consent in Sampling
 In many jurisdictions, police and/or prosecutors 
seek to obtain DNA samples from persons suspected to 
be involved in an offense — for example, on arrest or 
at the point of being charged. Where legislation permits 
the taking of samples without consent, it has become 
normal practice to take such samples with buccal swabs, 
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a procedure that is recognized as less invasive than 
earlier methods that required the surface of the body to 
be punctured in order to take blood. In the small number 
of cases where subjects may refuse to provide a sample, 
and where there is a legal basis for forcible sampling, this 
is usually done by plucking hairs from the scalp because 
hair roots contain nuclear DNA. Another form of such 
sampling is the scraping or cutting of fi ngernails [66]. 
In this case, the considered use of sampling methods 
refl ects dignitarian concerns both for the donor and 
also for criminal justice staff taking samples, translated 
into health and safety concerns, both of which will 
have some impact on the drive for further scientifi c and 
technological innovation.
 Jurisdictions differ in legislation concerning the 
categories of persons from which samples may be taken 
without consent; however, there are situations in which 
consent should be sought for the taking of samples. 
Victims and witnesses may have to be sampled in order to 
differentiate their genetic material from those of suspects 
and to eliminate them from further inquiries. Both groups 
are unlikely to be sampled without consent, and the 
material taken from them will normally be available only 
for comparison with other samples taken in relation to the 
particular crime under investigation. This difference in 
treatment is a refl ection of the signifi cance of dignitarian 
concerns and their application to the criminal context. 
 Questions around consent also emerge when such 
sampling is used in intelligence-led mass screening 
in which individuals meeting investigation-relevant 
identity criteria (for example, age, gender, occupation, 
place of work, or home location) may be approached to 
provide samples in order to exonerate themselves from, 
or implicate themselves or others (via a later familial 
search) in, any involvement with an offense. Should they 
fail to comply, their decision may be taken as an indicator 
of involvement. Equally, should their sample lead to a 
partial match on a DNA database, instigating suspicion 
of a family member, then their right not to bear witness 
against a family member has been circumvented [148]. A 
commitment to the integrity of persons suggest that such 
samples should only be taken with consent, but rules 
concerning the comparison and retention of such samples 
and profi les can also raise ethical concerns. In some 
jurisdictions, profi les obtained from samples collected in 
such mass screens may be retained and compared with 
profi les obtained from crimes other than those for which 
the sample is currently sought, for example in UK. In 
such instances it is important that the person providing 
the sample is made fully aware of this extended — and 
otherwise unanticipated — use of their bodily material, 
and be furnished with the right to withdraw their consent 
and/or sample.
3. Sampling from Crime Scenes
 In the forensic context, biological material is gathered 
for DNA extraction and profi ling from a variety of sources 
in addition to the consensual or nonconsensual sampling 
of known donors. Regimes for the collection, analysis, 
and retention of biological material recovered from 
scenes of crime have not especially troubled those who 
have expressed worries about the expansion of forensic 
short tandem repeat DNA profi ling. The only exception 
to this concerns the practice in some jurisdictions of the 
surreptitious sampling of objects known to have been in 
contact with criminal suspects, such as cigarette ends, 
bottles, or clothing, where investigators either do not have 
the power to request samples or do not wish their interest 
in a subject to become known. However, there are new 
forensic technologies that are focused not on samples 
collected from individual subjects but only on samples 
collected from crime scenes. For this reason it can be 
argued that no new dignity or integrity issues are raised 
by their application. Nonetheless, both of these issues 
can clearly arise when the results of crime-scene sample 
analysis are fed into investigations, and individuals or 
groups that have the characteristics inferred through 
phenotyping or through ancestral analysis are approached 
to provide DNA samples. Individuals who come to police 
attention because they share characteristics uncovered by 
the analysis of crime-scene samples may be interviewed 
and asked to give a sample, or they may be asked to 
come forward to donate samples together with others 
in an intelligence-led mass screen. In either case, it is 
reasonable to ask what protection dignitarian principles 
may afford these individuals, and how this protection 
may be balanced against the operational needs of lawful 
criminal investigations.
 A concern with this issue may also extend beyond a 
focus on those individuals who have been approached, to 
a focus on the social group who are — rightly or wrongly 
— associated with the specifi c ancestral or externally 
visible characteristics of interest. This is primarily a 
concern about the dignity of a group of people, and how 
they may potentially be treated as generally suspected 
of involvement in the crime under investigation. Certain 
measures (for example, a restriction in the dissemination 
of relevant information) may be required to protect such 
groups from increased public vilifi cation. In such cases, 
ethical support for criminal justice objectives may need 
to balance two different types of public interest: public 
safety as the objective of the criminal investigation, 
and the safety of particular minority groups as a matter 
of social inclusion or cohesion [25,34,95]. The most 
signifi cant instance of such a dilemma arises in the 
use of markers for biogeographic ancestry since it is 
likely that minority population groups (who might 
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already have asserted a history of police discrimination) 
may experience the application of this technology as 
another instance of a racialized investigation. Insofar 
as the issue is also one of distributive justice, we will 
discuss it in more detail later in this review, but it will 
be important for forensic geneticists involved in the use 
of these technologies to explain fully to investigators 
the basis of the genetics of ancestral markers, especially 
how they may be distinguished from popular (mis)
understandings of “race” or “ethnicity”. Some potential 
affronts to dignity may be avoided if the scientists 
provide detailed guidance on which population groups 
should be approached to provide DNA samples wherever 
analysis has shown that it is likely that a member of such 
a group is the potential source of a particular crime-
scene sample. Assistance to investigators in the wording 
of requests and the characterization of the ancestral 
groups, as well as in managing expectations about the 
nature of the information investigators may receive, will 
also help with dignitarian issues that relate to voluntary 
participation in such investigative strategies.
C. Genetic Informativity and Personal Privacy
 Dignity and integrity issues relate largely to 
how human bodies should be treated as well as to an 
understanding of the relationship between bodies, 
personal identity, and autonomous action. The concept 
of privacy refers less to the treatment of a person’s body 
itself, and more to information about persons and their 
bodies [48]. Most societies recognize that persons have 
a legitimate expectation that certain kinds of information 
about them be kept private. Although the concept of 
privacy is an essentially contested one [44] with a variety 
of connotations, the breadth of such an expectation 
encompasses a number of related concepts and 
principles such as “confi dentiality, secrecy, anonymity, 
data protection, data security, fair information practices, 
decisional autonomy, and freedom from unwanted 
intrusion” [122]. Largely because of this conceptual 
looseness, legal and ethical deliberations of privacy 
rights and the conditions under which some such rights 
may be breached (and by whom) have been complex and 
extensive.
 Privacy issues have always been at the center of 
ethical interrogations of forensic genetics from its fi rst 
appearance in the mid-1980s. There exists a large body 
of commentary concerned with assessing the seriousness 
of the potential infringement on privacy rights 
occasioned by the sampling, profi ling, retention, and 
subsequent sharing of DNA profi le information derived 
from individuals sampled in the course of criminal 
investigations. Many relevant international investigative 
instruments recognize privacy as a fundamental human 
right. Many different kinds of genetic information 
are mobilized in a number of diverse environments, 
including medical research, health care, paternity 
testing, advertising, popular culture, and forensic 
science. In each of these domains, claims for genetic 
informativity — that analysis of the human genome 
can provide domain relevant information — are subject 
to differing criteria of evaluation and accountability. 
The kind of genomic information sought and produced 
by those using DNA profi ling in support of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions varies according to the 
specifi c technologies used and on the context in which 
such data are required, produced, and negotiated. This 
context has administrative, legal, and social dimensions 
that infl uence the production and interpretation of 
forensic genetic data, and as such its informative value 
and normative authority. Despite these differences, the 
legitimate privacy expectations of individuals whose 
genomic information has been collected and used have 
always been foregrounded as requiring consideration by 
publics, policymakers, and practitioners.
 Broad data-protection principles are often implicitly 
or explicitly deployed in discussions of the data generated 
by forensic DNA profi ling. The primary claims here 
posit that processing should be limited to the specifi c 
purpose of criminal investigation and prosecution, data 
should be kept securely and confi dentially, it should be 
fairly processed following legislative and regulatory 
frameworks, and, once an investigation has been 
completed, genetic data obtained from witnesses and 
victims as elimination samples should be destroyed. 
Jurisdictions differ markedly in their willingness to 
destroy data derived from samples taken from arrestees, 
those charged with, and those convicted of a crime. 
However, privacy issues in forensic genetics cannot 
be reduced to data-protection issues, and in any case, 
the criminal justice context is recognized generally to 
require a different approach to data protection than that 
which applies in other social contexts.
 Four topics have recurred most often in discussions 
of privacy pertaining to autosomal STR sampling and 
profi ling, and DNA databasing. They are listed below.
1. The Nature of the Genetic Information Contained in 
Forensic DNA Profi les
 From the instantiation of DNA profi ling, research 
scientists, forensic practitioners, policymakers, judicial 
actors, and police users of this technology have 
consistently argued that the loci included from such 
profi les are drawn from noncoding regions of the human 
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genome, and as such contain no personally sensitive 
private information about the person sampled. A typical 
instance of such assertion made by a Spanish group 
of researchers is that “Legal and specifi c regulation is 
absolutely essential with regard to criminal investigation, 
so that only markers or loci whose alleles are not 
associated with any kind of phenotypical information 
are used. These should only possess an identifying value 
without providing any medical information whatsoever” 
[51]. The authors of the paper explain that such an 
approach helps to safeguard forensic practice from some 
of its critics, and also that it reduces concerns about 
the safe storage and possible sharing of such data since 
profi les generated from these kinds of data provide no 
useful information beyond their identifi catory function. 
Therefore there is no reason for individuals whose DNA 
is profi led during criminal investigations to be concerned 
that profi le data could be shared with, or interrogated by, 
those with medical, employment, or insurance interests. 
Forensic STR DNA profi les contain no information 
relevant to such interests. This argument has played 
an important part in securing public support for the 
technology, which might otherwise be thought to intrude 
unacceptably into the private lives of citizens, even those 
suspected of involvement in criminal acts.
2. Sample and Profi le Retention and Access
 Because of the potential information that resides in 
the biomaterial samples, legislative frameworks have 
often carefully specifi ed rules for sample retention or 
destruction following successful profi ling and/or the 
conclusion of criminal prosecutions for which samples 
have been relevant. Analysis, retention, and destruction 
regimes have usually treated crime-scene samples 
differently from samples taken from known subjects, 
in that a wider range of genetic interrogations may be 
made of the former when STR profi les generated from 
them have failed to match known subject profi les. 
Greater protection from additional forms of analysis is 
given to the latter when they are retained, or they may 
be destroyed after profi ling to prevent further analysis 
taking place.
 Closely related to this is a concern with the retention 
of, access to, and uses made of profi les. Every jurisdiction 
specifi es that profi les are only to be used in support 
of police investigations or criminal justice objectives. 
However, the inclusiveness of what is meant by “police” 
or “criminal justice” may not always be clear, and so 
ethical deliberation has to take into account any elasticity 
in the meanings of these terms. Most jurisdictions concede 
the value of continuously speculatively searching all 
lawfully obtained DNA profi les against all incoming 
profi les obtained from crime scenes, but questions arise 
about which category of persons, once profi led, should 
be retained for such searches. Privacy rights are engaged 
by such a practice. Although the privacy rights of those 
convicted of a crime may rightfully be reduced by the 
fact of their criminal actions, jurists and ethicists may 
also ask whether the same reduction in rights is justifi ed 
for those who have been arrested but not charged, or for 
those charged but not convicted. And is the same regime 
to be imposed regardless of the age of the person who 
has been subject to the criminal process?
 The most important judicial ruling on such privacy 
of signifi cance to forensic genetics was delivered in 
December 2008 by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in the case of S and Marper v the UK 
Government [27]. In this case, an 11-year-old boy, “S”, 
and an adult, Marper, had each been arrested and sampled 
during the course of investigations that did not result in 
their conviction of any offense. Their subsequent efforts 
to have these samples destroyed and profi les removed 
from the UK NDNAD met with failure at each level of 
relevant UK judicial deliberation. The fi nal decision in 
this case, that of the House of Lords in 2004, was that 
the retention of their DNA did not breach either their 
privacy right or their right against discrimination in 
relevant articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to the extent that the state should be denied this 
contribution to the prevention and detection of crime. 
However, members of the ECtHR disagreed with the 
lower court’s judgment and unanimously ruled that
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers 
of retention of the fi ngerprints, cellular samples and 
DNA profi les of persons suspected but not convicted 
of offences ... fails to strike a fair balance between 
the competing public and private interests and that 
the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable 
margin of appreciation in this regard. Accordingly, 
the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate 
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for 
private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society. [27]
 The strength and clarity of this judgment is such 
that all subsequent European legislation and practice 
relating to the retention of DNA samples and profi les 
taken from individual subjects (and hence any uses that 
can be made of these samples and profi les) should be 
prudent in taking it into account (for example, the UK 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 has done so). The 
reasoning used by the ECtHR judges on this issue invites 
us to balance the contribution of forensic genetics to the 
general good of crime detection and crime prevention 
against the individual good of privacy. The notion of a 
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balance between public and private interests (of which 
privacy is simply one of the latter) is a common trope in 
discussions of such measures. For some academic and 
legal authorities, a person has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their DNA profi le if the sample from which 
the profi le was developed was taken lawfully during 
the course of a criminal investigation. Proponents of 
this argument usually cite its value to crime-control 
imperatives, but also restrict the uses of such profi les 
to “law enforcement” or to the “investigation of crime 
and the prosecution of offenders”, “criminal justice,” or 
“police” uses. A recent decision by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, US, instantiates this position in its judgment that, 
following the lawful procedure of DNA collection and 
profi ling, defendants/donors have no standing to object 
to the retention of the sample and profi le in the national 
US DNA database CODIS [142].
 This judgment, and similar ones made by legal and 
other scholars about DNA profi le and sample retention, 
are informed by what one of us has already called a 
“genomic minimalist” rendering of the informational 
signifi cance of forensic DNA profi ling [160]. This 
characterization emphasizes that the genomic data 
used for the construction of profi les are derived from 
noncoding regions of DNA and therefore cannot be used 
to infer any personal or private attributes of the subject 
from whom the sample was taken. Although the ECtHR 
judges were not impressed by this argument, arguing that 
the mere possession of genetic data was already a breach 
of privacy rights, others have been more willing to cite 
it as grounds for limiting the signifi cance of privacy 
critiques.
 One fi nal feature of privacy aspects of sample and 
profi le information arises from assertions concerning 
a person’s right to know what data has been collected 
about them. In most liberal-democratic societies, donors 
of biological samples whose genetic profi le has been 
retained as part of a criminal investigation are likely to 
have the right to their profi le information, and to know 
that such data have been destroyed once they are no 
longer needed for legitimate purposes and as regulation 
requires or permits it. This issue of data deletion as 
part of information management is informed in part 
by reference to the “right to be forgotten” (sometimes 
the “right to deletion” or “right to oblivion”). Although 
not fully settled as a legal notion, a right to be forgotten 
resonates with the rehabilitative objective of criminal 
justice systems, and may even be argued as a prerequisite 
in the fulfi lment of this legitimate aim. Equally, the 
informational rights of convicted offenders may be seen 
as very different from suspects, “persons of interest”, or 
witnesses [163].
3. Privacy and Investigative Intelligence
 In many criminal jurisdictions, the tenor of forensic 
genetic privacy deliberations has been shifted by efforts 
to enhance the informativity of genetic analysis of crime-
scene stains. Some of these efforts have been based on 
enriched uses of the conventional STR multiplexes 
utilized for forensic DNA databasing. The techniques of 
“familial searching” (or “genetic proximity testing” to 
use the term preferred by Prainsack [119] to distinguish 
between biological and social relatedness) provide 
a conspicuous instance of this trend, and for some 
commentators, the use of these techniques contradicts 
the minimalist claim even as it relates to noncoding 
genomic information. The ECtHR judgment referred to 
above certainly took this view, arguing that the use of 
DNA profi les to identify genetic relationships as well as 
genetic distinctiveness was an interference with the right 
to private life of those people potentially caught up in 
this process.
 The other main development concerning DNA-
based intelligence lies in efforts to develop single 
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) panels capable of 
proving information about attributes of the source 
of the biological sample in question. SNP markers 
refer to biallelic differences (alternatives, insertions, 
or deletions) at single points on the genome. Taken 
singly, they will not necessarily discriminate well 
between two sources, but when a large number of 
SNPs are combined in “SNP panels” or “SNP arrays”, 
then their discriminative power is enhanced. It seems 
generally agreed that SNPs provide exceptionally useful 
supplements to standard STR methods since they provide 
a very large number of potential markers; the analysis of 
SNP arrays can be highly automated; and they do not 
require the longer genomic sequences necessary for STR 
analysis [4–6,73,74,113]. The move from the analysis of 
noncoding to coding areas of the genome and the use of 
such analysis to inform investigations require forensic 
genetic practitioners to revisit existing understandings 
and assertions of privacy issues in forensic DNA 
profi ling and databasing. Again, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruling from 2008 [27] provides European 
practitioners and policymakers with a useful baseline for 
a reconsideration of privacy issues in the light of these 
new forensic genetic technologies. For this court, even 
autosomal STR profi les contained “substantial amounts 
of unique personal data” to make their collection, storage, 
and use an interference to the right to privacy. Moreover, 
the court also commented that “the possibility … created 
for inferences to be drawn as to ethic origin makes 
their retention all the more sensitive and susceptible of 
affecting the right to private life” (§76) [27]. It is clear 
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that the court was focusing on samples taken from known 
subjects and not on samples taken from crime scenes, 
but both Murphy [100] and Koops and Schellekens [77] 
have already made the point that where information is 
fi rst obtained from an unknown donor’s crime-scene 
stain and such stains are later shown to originate from 
a particular donor, then information obtained about an 
unknown person turns into private information about a 
known person. At the very least there is a question about 
the subsequent retention and use of such information.
 Much of the discussion of developments in DNA 
phenotyping and their implications for privacy protection 
has focused on the distinction between the prediction 
of externally visible characteristics (EVCs) and the 
prediction of other bodily characteristics that are not 
visible to an external observer. It is often argued that 
EVCs are, by defi nition, publicly available information 
and do not therefore engage legitimate privacy concerns 
[69,70]. Some have argued that if and when the use of 
EVCs leads to the inclusion of a group of persons in 
an investigation, all of whom share the characteristics 
of interest, they are effectively defi ning all members of 
this group as suspects. Once considered as suspects, their 
right to privacy may be reduced and they may be obliged 
to provide samples in order to be eliminated from an 
inquiry [96]. Although this may be no different from the 
process undergone by members of such groups who might 
have been approached in nongenetic, intelligence-led 
mass screens, it is already recognized that when such mass 
screens have seemed to target vulnerable minorities, they 
are not always trusted, and often resented, by those who 
feel at risk. Others have suggested that EVCs are similar 
to eyewitnessing but more reliable, and as such there is no 
reason for excessive privacy concerns to surface in relation 
to visible physical traits [71,72]. In addition, Koops and 
Schellekens characterize visible characteristics as “non-
privacy sensitive” [77] and suggest that as long as the 
analysis of EVCs is lawful and adds value to a criminal 
investigation, it is likely to be proportionate to criminal 
justice objectives. The data arising from such analysis 
may even be instrumental in retrospectively tracing 
the police investigation process once the donor of the 
sample has been identifi ed as a suspect, and may thus 
contribute to addressing informational rights of the 
suspect. However, others argue that it is important that 
EVC data from a specifi c case are not centrally retained 
and therefore do not contribute to the establishment of 
new kinds of policing or criminal justice DNA databases 
[148].
 The use of ancestry informative markers (AIMs) 
certainly raises issues concerning the private lives 
of individuals inasmuch as familial and communal 
lineage is widely regarded as a private matter, even 
though it is one that is often shared with (some) others 
under circumstances freely chosen by the individuals 
concerned. However, it is the use of such markers in 
specifi c case contexts that has to be directly addressed 
when deliberating the legitimacy of potential privacy 
breaches of this kind. We have already indicated the 
circumstances in which investigative leads based on such 
markers may become relevant. A claim to the privacy 
of the genetic information available in a crime-scene 
stain would be diffi cult to sustain, although this does not 
address the privacy rights of those who might later be 
approached to be sampled because they are a member of 
a particular population subgroup. When the agreement 
sought is voluntary (as it usually is where intelligence-
led mass screening is used), there is already an implicit 
recognition of the informational privacy rights that reside 
in the person’s sample. When samples are requested or 
required following other investigative actions to identify 
potential suspects, then these rights may already be in 
jeopardy. In either case, principles of retributive justice 
and solidarity (discussed below) may be used to justify 
the request. Nevertheless, the persistence of opposing 
values means that some assessment of the proportionality 
of the privacy breach will need to be made on a case-by-
case basis, or at least on the basis of what kind of case is 
being investigated and what other investigative actions 
may alternatively be taken.
4. Privacy and Massively Parallel Sequencing
 Massively parallel sequencing (MPS), also known 
as next-generation sequencing, makes possible, in 
one DNA reaction, the collection of autosomal STRs, 
Y-STRs, mitochondrial markers, and mRNA as well 
as a variety of EVC- and AIM-relevant SNPs and 
“Indels” (or insertions/deletions). More SNPs may also 
be included in the arrays that comprise commercially 
available MPS kits. It is possible to run reactions for 
STR identifi cation separately but it is also possible to use 
the whole array if required. Genealogical connections 
are already routinely interrogated by the use of Y-STRs 
and mitochondrial DNA, but the inclusion of these in 
MPS kits may make their uses more common. Although 
the privacy implications of this increase are insignifi cant 
when confi ned to the comparison of DNA collected 
in the course of criminal investigations, additional 
considerations may arise if crime-scene DNA is 
searched against commercially managed “recreational” 
or research genealogical databases. One recent US 
case involved access to the “Sorensen Y Chromosome” 
database [52] for information about a person identifi ed 
through a familial search supplied to police following 
court-warranted actions, and since that case, access to 
the database has become more restricted. The possibility 
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that future police searches of such databases — with or 
without judicial authority — may undermine undertakings 
given to individuals who donated their samples is a 
matter of concern that needs close consideration. Even 
more care would need to be exercised if it became 
possible to search medical research databases or other 
kinds of medical records for genetic results that allowed 
comparison with results obtained from the analysis of 
crime-scene samples. Even though it is likely that such 
searches could only be conducted on a case-by-case basis 
and supported by judicial authority, the prospects of such 
a development may reduce the willingness of individuals 
to donate samples to medical databases in particular, and 
also have a chilling effect on individuals’ trust of key 
social institutions.
 It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that 
investigators may seek further information from 
the application of MPS technologies in situations 
where none of the currently standard technologies 
have provided actionable intelligence. It is likely that 
progress in DNA analysis will increasingly deliver the 
capacity to derive disease propensity as well other kinds 
of medically relevant information from crime-scene 
stains. Clearly such developments engage many of the 
ethical principles and issues we have already raised in 
this guide, and forensic geneticists are encouraged to 
engage with these. A complicating fact here is that the 
seemingly clear boundary between forensic genetic 
applications and the use of genetic knowledge within 
clinical medicine (or medical research) is actually rather 
opaque. Genetic inquiries can cross contexts of use 
(for example, there may be medical issues relevant to 
a criminal investigation or a paternity determination). 
A similar permeability may occur because medical 
information and genetic information have to be used 
in combination (for example, to determine the robust 
identifi cation of bodies), and it can also occur because 
some data generated by the application of particular 
genotyping methods have relevance to both medical and 
nonmedical contexts (for example, analysis of ancestral 
lineage may be relevant for biomedical research and 
for forensic identifi cation). Access to medical records 
in order to follow up investigative leads based on these 
kinds of analysis are likely to require judicial approval, 
but when such approval is granted, forensic science 
practitioners will fi nd themselves in possession of 
information about a sample donor that is unknown to 
themselves, which they may or may not want to know, 
and which they may or may not want shared with others. 
If cases occur in the future in which the application of 
MPS technologies results in knowledge of more sensitive 
genomic information, policymakers and practitioners 
may have to consider what ethical obligations attach to 
those who gain this information in such circumstances. 
Following Maclean [87], the question is how to balance 
state criminal-investigation interests against the right of 
individuals to have certain information about themselves 
if that information is available to others, their right not 
to know some such facts, and their right to control the 
circulation of this knowledge.
D. Justice and Equality
 Rawls has argued that justice — considered as the 
fair or equal treatment of all members of a society — is 
the “fi rst virtue of social institutions”, and for this reason 
justice and equality are central concepts in applied ethics 
[125]. Borrowing notions from Aristotle, we can give a 
clearer focus to thinking about the application of these 
concepts to forensic genetics by distinguishing between 
questions of retributive, procedural, and distributive 
justice.
1. Retributive Justice
 Also called corrective justice, this concept is 
concerned with the righting of wrongs, especially but not 
exclusively through the operations and outcomes of the 
criminal justice system. There is a large body of evidence 
showing that the development of DNA profi ling and 
databasing has contributed hugely to crime control and 
to retributive justice outcomes by providing actionable 
intelligence to investigators and evidence to adjudicators 
[11,30]. Offi cial statistics (often issued by database 
custodians) have shown the number of database matches 
and (sometimes) their contribution to investigations. 
A variety of research studies have also examined the 
contribution of DNA profi ling to the investigation of 
both property crime and crimes against the person 
[16,17,86,129]. Some commentaries have positioned 
forensic genetic developments by reference to the turn 
toward a biological culture in criminology, embedded 
in the increasing “biologization” and “geneticization” 
of society, specifi cally of popular culture and research 
cultures [50,107,131,154]. Since the late 1990s, the 
crime-control discourse has expanded efforts into 
understanding the causes of criminal behavior to 
include the genetic dimension. What Nikolas Rose has 
called the “biology of culpability” [132] has aimed to 
explore “genetic risk” — the genetic predisposition 
toward violent or antisocial behavior — which has not 
only become a consideration in sentencing but also for 
crime prevention. Specifi cally behavioral genetics aims 
to further understanding of tendencies toward violence 
and/or criminal behavior by exploring the genetic causes 
of crime, and social scientists have taken an interest in 
exploring its impact [41,83,111] as well as the potential 
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determinism inherent in much of behavioral genetics 
[2,32].
2. Procedural Justice
 This concept of justice is closely connected 
to the due-process perspective we mention in the 
“Introduction” section, and its objective is to guarantee 
that all those subject to legal proceedings are accorded 
their full rights. It is also concerned with the appropriate 
treatment of offenders. Procedural or due-process justice 
objectives have also benefi ted from the introduction of 
DNA profi ling into modern criminal justice systems. 
Two related developments are especially signifi cant. 
The fi rst is that the scientifi c basis and standardized 
laboratory application of this technology has often 
been contrasted with other less well-grounded forms 
of forensic technology. This has been given particular 
attention in recent major policy developments in 
forensic science in general, especially the work of the 
US National Research Council [105] in which DNA 
profi ling is singled out for particular commendation as a 
source and model of the application of robust science in 
support of procedural justice. The second development is 
the use of postconviction forensic DNA analysis, which 
has made possible the exoneration of individuals whose 
convictions were not secured by adequate due process at 
the time [130,159].
3. Distributive Justice
 The extent to which benefi ts and burdens are shared 
equally among all members of a community is the 
focus of distributive, or allocative, justice. The practical 
deployment of forensic genetics in the criminal justice 
context also engages distributive justice or equality 
issues that are deserving of consideration. Equality 
fi nds its most common expression in the right to not 
be “discriminated against based on any ground such as 
sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age, or sexual orientation” (Article 21 
[89]). However, it can also be interpreted as an aspect of 
fairness — equal opportunity — and as a right to equity, 
such as equal access to the benefi ts of technology uses 
and equal protection against any potentially damaging 
effects of their application. Issues of equal treatment have 
been a focus of ethical interest both in what categories of 
people have been the subject of forensic DNA sampling, 
and the effect on individuals in these categories of the 
retention and subsequent use of their samples and profi les 
in forensic DNA databases. Here, ethnicity and “race” 
are frequently problematized as intended or unintended 
grounds of unequal treatment of those sampled by police 
forces or security agencies. Accordingly, it has been 
argued that the use of this technology is both a refl ection 
and a further development in such unequal treatment. 
It may reinforce the stigmatization, or even aggravate 
vulnerabilities, of such minorities. Similar concerns 
have been voiced about database-retention practices of 
samples and profi les from children and young people as 
well as nonconvicted persons.
4. Justice and Databasing
 One of the main concerns of the Home Offi ce report 
“Keeping the Right People on the Database” [59] was 
to provide evidence for the seemingly common belief 
that persons arrested but not convicted have a higher 
chance of offending in the future, and that therefore it 
is legitimate to retain indefi nitely, for future speculative 
searching, DNA samples and profi les taken from arrestees 
(see [84] for a discussion of this general assumption). 
Although forensic genetics is silent on the substantive 
issue of database retention, there is a sense in which 
support for all DNA profi ling regimes — and therefore 
our understanding of the utility of forensic genetics 
in general — is affected by such arguments, and thus 
necessarily has to confront issues of the equal treatment 
of all individuals by the criminal justice system along 
with the potential stigmatization of particular individuals 
or groups that may result from their treatment within this 
system.
 It seems generally agreed that those who are proven 
to have committed criminal acts are less deserving 
of claims to some human rights than those who, to all 
appearances, have been law-abiding citizens. But this is 
only the case for those rights that are not absolute, and 
there are differences in the extent to which jurisdictions 
defi ne legitimate breaches to such conditional rights. 
Perhaps the usual policy rationale is that it is the 
provision of equal treatment within distinctive categories 
of persons, rather than between all categories of persons, 
that is most important to achieve. Thus all convicted 
prisoners may be deserving of equal treatment, but their 
treatment can legitimately differ from that accorded to 
law-abiding citizens, and that cutting across these and 
other categories are other relevant natural and social 
parameters like age or citizenship. Of course, there is 
continuous controversy about whether certain categories 
are legitimate or not, as well as how individuals are 
placed in one or another category.
 Earlier discussions of these matters focused largely 
on the question of the categories of persons whose DNA 
was — and should be — retained on forensic DNA 
databases. There have been many commentaries on the 
US and UK databasing regimes that have focused on the 
collection and retention of DNA samples and profi les 
161
Williams & Wienroth • Social  and Ethical Aspects of Forensic Genetics
from particular social groups that might be thought to be 
especially vulnerable to the stigmatizing effects of such 
practices — albeit conditioned by policing processes 
in general rather than forensic DNA databasing in 
particular. Studies that have focused on ethnicity and 
“race” include those of Duster [33,34], Ossorio and 
Duster [112], and Skinner [138]. Another set of studies 
has been more concerned with the legitimacy of the 
retention of samples and profi les from children and 
young people [90,150,151] as well as the unconvicted 
[58,91,92].
5. Equality and Forensic DNA Phenotyping
 Discussions of more recent innovations have raised 
questions of equality and stigma in a different way. Here, 
emerging innovations based on SNPs, such as AIMs and 
EVCs, have raised expectations that in the near future 
forensic techniques can, with a convincing degree of 
certainty, determine the population group origins of 
a human DNA sample as well as provide information 
on some of the physical attributes — such as skin 
pigmentation — of the person whose sample has been 
analyzed. Already, some studies have reported a degree of 
progress that gives cause for optimism about the capacity 
of such emergent technologies [69,72,133,139,155]. The 
use of these technologies represents a clear departure 
from earlier assurances to critics that forensic genetics 
only uses so-called “noncoding” parts of the genome 
that do not hold any signifi cant information about the 
individual and its relatives. Some have described this 
as a signifi cant extension of jurisdictional intrusion into 
bodies and the information derived from them in support 
of criminal justice ambitions [96,148]. These techniques 
continue to face opposition in legal terms, following the 
European Council Resolution 2001/C 187/01 of 25 June 
2001.
 The main question here is whether or not it is 
likely that the use of these technologies in specifi c 
investigations will result in the unequal treatment 
of particular social groups who become the focus of 
investigative attention following the successful genetic 
analysis of crime-scene samples. The most obvious 
instance would be where members of a minority ethnic 
community become persons of interest as a result of the 
application of AIMs. The fact that such individuals may 
become persons of interest for other reasons — typically 
because of witness statements or other forms of police 
intelligence — is not especially relevant to answering 
this question since the positive and negative meanings 
accorded to genetic science mean that more investigative 
weight as well as more social freight accompany its 
deployment. For some critical observers, promises 
about the potential utility and informativity of emerging 
technologies, such as forensic DNA phenotyping and 
biogeographic ancestry, may be heard as confl ating 
scientifi c principles and cultural categories, an effect 
that may in turn proliferate or worsen existing forms 
of unequal treatment based on ethnicity and perceived 
“race”. Forensic genetic research in these areas taps 
into a long and controversial history of classifying 
human individuals and groups through their genetic 
properties. This means that forensic geneticists are by 
default steeped in a controversial history of classifying 
human individuals and groups through their genetic 
properties. Concerns about the use of “racial” categories 
in forensic genetics, and their possible relationship 
to race issues in criminal justice generally have been 
reiterated recently [25,33,112], with some even warning 
of a creeping scientifi cated politics of “eugenics” [32] or, 
more specifi cally, a “racialization” of forensic genetics 
[138] through the production of genetic “facts” based on 
culturally conceived and unrefl ective assumptions. This 
sociopolitical history and the discourse around “race” 
and “ethnicity” used in forensic contexts refl ect concerns 
that traditionally conceived views may be entangled 
with emergent technologies, and in turn impact on 
wider public and policy perceptions of legitimate efforts 
to identify the larger population groups to which any 
individual may belong. Although contemporary societal, 
as well as individual, governance mobilizes recent and 
emergent biological insights, data, and technologies — 
what has been described as “biopolitics” [132,140] — 
these need to be challenged as to their underlying social 
and cultural assumptions. Forensic genetic techniques 
such as the use of ancestry informative markers aim 
to enable probabilistic statements about the individual 
through the classifi cation of human populations based 
on racial and ethnic distinctions for governance purposes 
such as criminal justice.
 Scientists point out that genetic research has 
increased understanding of the genetic variations within 
populations and — although the mechanisms of AIMs 
rely on identifying such variations — these are actually 
considered to be smaller between different biogeographic 
ancestry groups than those genetic variations that 
exist within the same populations, as such challenging 
racial stereotypes [8,145]. Additional issues arise 
when dealing with the mixed ancestry of many modern 
individuals. The concerns raised by Skinner, Duster, and 
M’Charek [33,94,138], however, focus much more on 
the cultural bias at individual and institutional levels 
in law enforcement and security agencies who deploy 
forensic genetics technologies, which need to be taken 
into account when EVCs and AIMs are deployed and 
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analysis results are reported to the user. A recurrent 
argument attends to the differences between genetic 
ethnic identifi cation and self-identifi cation of a donor, or 
even the attributed ethnicity of a donor through the person 
collecting samples. Cho and Sankar [24] argue that in 
policing practice it is often assumed that a preconceived 
reference population and the suspect correspond, yet 
methods of assigning race or ethnicity have not yet 
undergone a process of standardization, and are more 
often than not dependent on the individual conducting 
the assignment, and her interpretation of local reference 
populations. There is also considerable concern about 
their differing social and scientifi c connotations [13]. 
Populations (groups and subgroups) are the basis for 
“knowing” genetically, yet categories such as ethnic 
identity are socially constructed, indeed are a vital part 
of active identifi cation of individuals and communities 
[25,93,138]. Even biological categories — and reference 
populations — are products of human classifi cation 
and a necessary reduction of a complex world for 
effi cacious and effi cient engagement with it. Using these 
to make factual statements, critics anticipate, could lead 
DNA profi ling to enforce, or at least support, existing 
unrefl ective social assumptions about race and ethnicity, 
including simplistic associations between biogeographic 
ancestry and phenotype.
 On the technical level, an additional problem can 
arise because the boundary between the development and 
uses of ancestry-informative SNPs and the development 
and uses of phenotype-informative SNPs can be diffi cult 
to discern in the operationalization of data gained from 
deploying these technologies in police practice. AIMs 
are short sequences of DNA known to vary in frequency 
between geographically dispersed populations with 
no concern given to phenotype (some markers may 
be associated with it, some may not); markers used to 
predict EVCs are associated with phenotype, with no 
immediate reference to ancestry/ethnicity; although they 
may be associated with it. Some studies are concerned 
to provide descriptors that are neutral with respect to 
ancestral features, while also being concerned to focus 
on SNPs “located in and nearby genes known for their 
important role in pigmentation” in order to predict skin 
and eye color [139]. Other studies involving coloration 
— in this case eye color — point to the diffi culty caused 
by the existence of a “complex and continuous range of 
intermediate phenotypes distinct from blue and brown 
eye colours” [133]. In addition, of course, cosmetic 
changes adopted by individuals can change these and 
other aspects of their appearance. These points of tension 
are inherent to themes of the convincing — but sometimes 
contested — capacity of DNA to tell us something about 
the identity of individuals and populations, and the 
ability of science and technology to realize that capacity 
[138].
 Even where these social and cognitive dangers are 
avoided by careful and close attention to what is meant 
by ancestral groups, it has been suggested that the results 
obtained from the application of these technologies are 
more likely to be seen by investigators as useful when 
they allow attention to be focused on smaller rather than 
larger social groups [93,94]. Although it can be argued 
that such attention is justifi ed by the scientifi c results 
obtained from the analysis of biological material, it is 
still possible that existing social prejudices against 
such minorities can be reinforced if the results are 
promulgated carelessly. On the other hand, there is a 
clear possibility that the fi ndings from these technologies 
in particular cases can result in the removal of suspicion 
from members of particular minority groups as well as 
focusing attention on members of other groups.
 Despite the critical commentaries referred to 
above, there is obvious value in being able to provide 
investigators with information about the visual 
appearance of criminal suspects by the analysis of 
genetic material that has been recovered from crime 
scenes. There have been several conspicuous cases in 
which forensic DNA phenotyping, specifi cally AIMs, 
have been used successfully to support the investigation 
of serious crime [134,152]. There have also been 
some cases in which the uses of the technologies have 
been suboptimal [156,157]. The current accuracy of 
phenotyping inferences varies according to the physical 
feature under consideration. Although this does not 
raise an intractable problem, it reinforces the need for 
researchers and practitioners to be clear about claims 
for scope and accuracy — What can be done with what 
level of predictive exactitude. Some commentators have 
reminded investigators and others that it is important not 
to conclude too quickly that a person identifi ed through 
a phenotype-led investigative strategy is necessarily 
the perpetrator, at least not before their DNA is taken, 
their STRs are compared with those obtained from the 
crime-scene sample, and other corroborative evidence 
becomes available [88]. An example here is the use 
of such technologies as “biological witness” as some 
have claimed that EVCs can provide a signifi cant 
improvement to what are recognized as especially 
problematic eyewitness descriptions of individuals 
and their physical characteristics [22,43]; in this way 
reliable EVC inferencing may reduce the risk to innocent 
individuals of misidentifi cation. Others have suggested 
that the relationship between eyewitnessing and forensic 
DNA phenotyping is more complicated than that since 
any of its outputs would still need to be interpreted by 
those asked to provide further information based on this 
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intelligence, including what may be called eyewitnesses 
[148], and since forensic genetics comes with a host of 
claims and expectations about its reliability and scientifi c 
nature that may reduce the weight of concerns over its 
analyses for some.
 If managed carefully, these new forensic genetic 
technologies can contribute to principles of due process 
in that they can provide a scientifi cally based rationale 
for directing investigations in particular situations. 
EVCs inferred, or AIMs obtained, from crime-scene 
stains may allow the creation of a pool of suspects in 
which some individuals may be included and from which 
other individuals may be excluded, and this information 
may be helpful for the design of intelligence-led mass 
screens. It is also possible that some individuals who 
have already been suspected of involvement in a crime 
can be excluded from subsequent inquiries because they 
do not have the relevant physical or ancestral feature(s).
E. Social Solidarity and Communalism
 Described by Cutter [29] as an alternative to the 
“Naïve Position,” which balances social gains against 
individual harms, the relevance of social solidarity 
desiderata have been especially well articulated by 
Etzioni in a series of books and papers that apply his 
communitarian perspective to a range of topics, including 
privacy concerns in general; ID cards and biometric 
identifi ers; and the ethical, legal, and policy aspects of 
forensic DNA profi ling and databasing [37–39]. Relying 
on both empirical (“benefi ts to public safety are very 
substantial” [38]) and normative arguments (privacy 
is a “social license” to carry out a limited number of 
acts free from “communal, public, and governmental 
scrutiny” [37]), Etzioni concedes that forensic DNA 
tests and databases are intrusive interventions into the 
lives of citizens (even though minimal ones), but is 
also keen to distinguish how these technologies should 
legitimately be applied to different categories of persons 
— especially “criminals, suspects and innocents” (the 
fi rst of these possessing only diminished rights that can 
be weighed against the high public interest in being able 
to identify them genetically, and the third possessing 
full rights with only low public interest in collecting and 
retaining their biological samples). Although Etzioni’s 
preference is always for “moral persuasion” for achieving 
a balance between individual and community interests, 
rather than coercion as a source of social order, his 
view of the liberal democratic state is a predominantly 
benign one. This means for him that, as long as both 
scientifi c and operational aspects of forensic genetics 
are predominantly state-provided (or very closely state-
regulated) these activities are deserving of civic trust.
 Public interest and public goods such as security, 
safety, and justice can justify the application of such 
technologies, and the ethical principle that can be drawn 
upon is that of social solidarity. Legitimate efforts toward 
achieving such public goods may even be seen as positing 
obligations on persons to assist the criminal justice 
system in their work. Nevertheless, as we have indicated 
above, there is a continued need to consider where such 
social obligations may confl ict with individual rights, and 
how to manage the confl ict of perspectives. The ethical 
principle of solidarity speaks to the communal cohesion 
necessary for individual fl ourishing in society, or what 
Häyry calls “a sense of togetherness” [55]. As such, it 
reminds us that the other principles we have listed and 
discussed above tend to focus largely on the individual 
person and give less attention to the signifi cance of the 
collective in deciding on moral courses of action. A recent 
Nuffi eld Council on Bioethics report [120] distinguishes 
between the operation of this ethical principle at:
1. Interpersonal level: “the willingness to carry costs to 
assist others with whom a person recognises sameness 
or similarity in at least one relevant respect”'
2. Group level: “a collective commitment to carry costs 
to assist others who are all linked by means of a shared 
situation or cause”; and 
3. Contractual level: where legal obligations exist 
as in the case of “welfare state and social welfare 
arrangements.” 
 The fi rst two levels emphasize that acting on the 
principle to give up aspects of autonomy in exchange 
for community benefi ts is necessarily a voluntary 
choice that individuals may wish to make. In choosing 
to act according to a principle of solidarity in liberal 
democratic societies, there remains a legitimate 
expectation that rights to dignity, privacy, justice, and 
equality are respected by others. It is assumed that 
relinquishing some aspects of such rights will result in 
a more fl ourishing life for all than would be possible 
if each individual insisted on the full and untrammeled 
exercise of only their own personal rights. The principle 
of reciprocity then reminds us of our ethical obligations 
to one another, and applied to the forensic context may 
help us determine what personal genetic information 
members of a society should be willing to provide 
— for research or for operational uses — in order to 
restore, preserve, or enhance their collective safety. This 
principle may be appealed to in justifi cation of the uses 
of forensic genetics in general, but we have already listed 
two specifi c kinds of occasions where individuals are not 
themselves designated as subjects of criminal suspicion 
but may be approached to provide bodily samples as 
witnesses of a crime or as subjects in an intelligence-led 
mass screening. In the latter case, of course, individuals 
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need to know that they are not subject to unjust kinds 
of profi ling — racial or otherwise — in which there is 
no mutually benefi cial outcome to be derived from the 
process. A similar question about the proper levels of 
reciprocity implicitly presumed by demands of solidarity 
can be asked when individuals are approached to provide 
genetic information in the course of a familial search. 
Here individuals may be approached to provide samples 
for DNA profi ling because they have been identifi ed as 
persons of interest due to their kinship proximity with a 
databased individual, some (but not all) of whose alleles 
have matched a crime-scene DNA profi le. Finally, and 
most obviously, a claim on ethical solidarity has been 
used to support proposals for population-wide forensic 
DNA databases. However, there have been no liberal 
democracies in which such proposals have been accepted 
by legislators. The only societies in which “universal” 
DNA databases have been seriously considered at the 
time of writing are several Persian Gulf states, and 
even here the legislative frameworks and organizational 
arrangements for these innovations are not yet in place.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
 This review has not favored one or another position 
in the tension fi eld between the three general approaches 
to forensic technologies in the criminal justice system: 
crime management, due process, and genetic surveillance. 
Instead, it has presented the key recurrent arguments 
and concerns about innovations in forensic genetics and 
their operational applications. One of the intentions of 
this review has been to raise awareness of the fact that 
those who wish to foster the innovation process in this 
sensitive area can only benefi t from a fuller knowledge 
of the kinds of reception — critical and supportive — 
that innovations in forensic genetics have received over 
the last 30 years. There is a need for criminal justice 
actors, policymakers, and publics to be better informed 
about the developing uses of forensic DNA, and there 
is also a need for those involved in the development of 
science and technology in this domain to engage more 
fully with civil society organizations, policymakers, and 
wider publics: “If a technology is intended for use in 
society — as, arguably, any under development is — its 
developers, commissioners, and potential users need to 
engage with its social contingencies … ethical and legal 
issues are not ‘burdens’ but opportunities for engagement 
and technology enhancement” [148].
 Social issues and ethical principles are subject to 
considerable interpretation, and there are many instances 
in which they may come into confl ict with one another, 
causing what some have called “right versus right” 
dilemmas. There will be circumstances in which, for 
example, individual rights may confl ict with collective 
rights, when privacy or dignity breaches have to be 
weighed against the goals of retributive justice, or when 
distributive justice goods have to be balanced against 
demands for solidarity. Much international and national 
jurisprudence, as well as many academic accounts of 
the ethics of forensic DNA profi ling, has invoked the 
“principle of proportionality” when adjudicating between 
confl icting ethical and legal imperatives. It is important 
that forensic genetic researchers and practitioners are 
able to engage with this principle and so we briefl y 
consider it here.
 The Council of Europe proposes that “the principle 
of proportionality requires that there be a reasonable 
relationship between a particular objective to be 
achieved and the means used to achieve that objective.” 
The principle is most often brought into play in 
European jurisprudence when consideration is given to 
the legitimacy of an interference with an acknowledged 
right included in the European Convention of Human 
Rights. To be proportionate, any such interference has 
to be “necessary in a democratic society”, and answer 
a “pressing social need”. For the application of forensic 
genetics this means that the uses of any particular variant 
of DNA technology need to be justifi ed as “necessary” 
within the context of the legal framework and criminal 
justice objectives. If analyses are especially ethically 
intrusive, it will also have to be shown that less-intrusive 
investigative measures have been tried and failed, or 
that they cannot be effective in a particular case context. 
Applications of this very open — textured principle thus 
require attention to be given to questions of effi cacy 
alongside questions of ethics — judgments of fact have 
to be made along with judgments of value. Lord Dyson’s 
judgment in Wood v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis [164] made it clear that an assessment of 
proportionality is more than a simple balancing when he 
stated that “the court is required to carry out a careful 
exercise of weighing the legitimate aim to be pursued, 
the importance of the right which is the subject of the 
interference and the extent of the interference” (§84).
 Empirical and normative issues necessarily become 
intertwined in assessments of proportionality, and 
perhaps for this reason assertions of the proportionality 
or disproportionality of a particular measure may be easy 
to make but also diffi cult to adjudicate. Accordingly, 
such assertions often remain contested, although at the 
very least their assessment encourages policymakers to 
provide sound evidence concerning factual matters, and 
sound reasoning concerning ethical ones.
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